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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court, by receiving letters from various 
individuals prior to sentencing as to matters to be considered in the 
course of sentencing Defendant, erred by not disclosing the nature 
and content of such letters to Defendant and thereby denied Defendant 
of his rights to due process and the effective assistance of counsel. 
5 
The appellate court reviews issues concerning constitutional rights 
for correction of error. State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 465-66 
(Utah 1991); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1266 (Utah 1993); see 
also State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1990), cert. 
denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991); Cf. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
940-41 (Utah 1994) (whether a defendant validly waived his or her 
Miranda rights is a question of law reviewed for correct of error); 
State v. Richardson, 843 P. 2d 517, 518 (Utah App. 1992) (trial 
court's interpretation of binding case law presents question of law 
that is reviewed for correctness); State v. Mabe, 864 P.2d 890, 892 
(Utah 1993) (ultimate legal determination of whether a confession is 
voluntary is conclusion of law, which is reviewed for correctness). 
This issue was not raised before the trial court. For the reasons 
stated below, this issue presents exceptional circumstances and/or 
circumstances constituting plain error. See State v. Archambeau, 820 
P.2d 920, 922-23 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 
1311 (Utah 1987), on subsequent appeal, 779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989). 
2. Whether the trial court erred by improperly interpreting 
the firearm enhancement statute or abused its discretion by 
sentencing Defendant to a determinate term of five years pursuant to 
the firearms enhancement statute set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
203. An appellate court will set aside a sentence imposed by a trial 
6 
court if the sentence represents an abuse of discretion, the trial 
court failed to consider all relevant factors, or the sentence 
imposed exceeded the limits prescribed by law. State v. Brown, 853 
P.2d 851, 861 (Utah 1992) (citing State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 
1135 (Utah 1989). However, the trial court's interpretation and 
application of a statute to a defendant's sentence is reviewed by the 
appellate court for correction of error. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 
1355, 1357 (Utah 1993); State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 
1992). This issue was not raised before the trial court. The 
circumstances of this issue present exceptional circumstances and/or 
circumstances constituting plain error. See State v. Archambeau, 820 
P.2d 920, 922-23 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 
1311 (Utah 1987), on subsequent appeal, 779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989). 
3. Whether trial counsel, by failing to object to the 
imposition by the trial court of a determinate five year firearm 
enhancement term pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203, denied 
Defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel. To make such a showing, Defendant must show, first, that 
counsel rendered a deficient performance, falling below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and, second, that 
counsel's performance was prejudicial. Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P. 2d 803 
(Utah 1988). Such claims present mixed questions of law and fact. 
7 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2070 
(1984). The appellate court defers to the trial court's findings of 
fact, but reviews its application of legal principles to its factual 
findings for correctness. State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Utah 1993) . 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution 
Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and 
regulations, whose interpretation is determinative, are set out 
verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body and arguments of 
the instant brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By information filed March 30, 1994, Defendant, Joseph DiLello, 
was initially charged with Murder, a First Degree Felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203. The information, pursuant to 
plea negotiation, was later amended so as to charge Defendant with 
Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code 
8 
Ann. §§ 76-5-103 and 76-3-203, alleging the use of a firearm in the 
course of the alleged Aggravated Assault. On June 27, 1995, 
Defendant pleaded guilty to Aggravated Assault. That same day, 
Defendant executed a Statement of Defendant in Advance of Plea of 
Guilty. The matter was then set for sentencing with Adult Probation 
and Parole directed to provide the trial court with a presentence 
investigation report. 
On August 8, 1995, Defendant and appointed counsel, Glen T. 
Cella, appeared for sentencing. The court sentenced Defendant to 
imprisonment at the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of 0-
5 years and ordered a firearm enhancement of five years to run 
consecutively. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. At approximately 4:00 a.m. on November 7, 1993, Defendant's 
brother Michael DiLello arrived at Defendant's home and immediately 
started pounding on the door (R. 345, Preliminary Hearing 
Transcript); 
2. Defendant and Defendant's wife, and others staying with 
Defendant and his wife, feared for their safety due to Michael's 
well-known violent tendencies (R. 336-37, Preliminary Hearing 
Transcript; R. 37, % 2, Information); 
9 
3. Through the door of Defendant's home, Michael was told not 
to come in and to go home (R. 33 9, Preliminary Hearing Transcript); 
4. Michael kicked in the door and rushed towards Defendant (R. 
342, Preliminary Hearing Transcript), at which time Defendant, who 
feared for his life, shot and killed Michael (Id.); 
5. Defendant was initially charged with Murder, a First Degree 
Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 by information 
filed March 30, 1994 (R. 36, Information); 
6. The information, pursuant to plea negotiation (see R. 149, 
Statement of Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty, H 3), was later 
amended so as to charge Defendant with Aggravated Assault, a Third 
Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-103 and 76-3-
203 (R. 155 Amended Information); 
7. At the Pretrial Hearing on June 27, 1995, Defendant pleaded 
guilty to Aggravated Assault (R. 157, Minute Entry; R. 233-61, 
Pretrial Hearing Transcript; R. 14 9, fH 3-5, Statement of Defendant 
in Advance of Plea of Guilty), after which the trial court set the 
matter for sentencing on August 8, 1995; 
8. On August 8, 1995, Defendant and his appointed counsel, 
Glen T. Cella, appeared for sentencing (R. 158, Minute Entry). At 
the beginning of the Hearing, the trial court stated: 
I received a Presentence Report. I've also 
received a number of other letters both from 
10 
parties that we've -- they were letters we 
previously received at the prior hearings. 
Also, I've received a letter from Valene Roundy, 
and also I think a letter from your mother that 
I have received. Now, Mr. Cella, have you had a 
chance to review the presentence report? 
(R. 178, lines 5-10, Sentencing Hearing Transcript); 
10. The trial court sentenced Defendant to imprisonment at the 
Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of 0-5 years and ordered 
a firearm enhancement of five years to run consecutively (R. 193, 
Sentencing Hearing Transcript); 
11. The trial court signed the Judgment and Commitment to the 
Utah State Prison on August 8, 1995, which was entered on August 10, 
1995 (R. 159, Judgment and Commitment to the Utah State Prison); 
12. Thereafter, the trial court's Sentence was entered on 
August 17, 1995 (R. 160-61, Sentence); 
13. Defendant filed Notice of Appeal on September 5, 1995 (R. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court failed to disclose the contents or 
substance of the letters received after Defendant's guilty plea and 
prior to sentencing. As a result, the trial court denied Defendant 
of his rights to due process and the effective assistance of counsel. 
By failing to disclose the contents or substance of the letters, the 
trial court failed to provide Defendant with his due process rights 
11 
of notice and the opportunity to examine the contents or the letters 
to determine their reliability and to effectively challenge any 
inaccurate information. In so doing, the trial court failed to 
insure that the decision-making process and the ultimate sentence was 
predicated upon accurate and reasonably reliable and relevant 
information. Further, the trial court made no effort to determine 
the reliability of the statements and allegations set forth the 
undisclosed letters. In the instant case, had the trial court 
disclosed the content or substance of the letters to Defendant's 
counsel or Defendant, there is a possibility that explanation or 
argument by Defendant's counsel or Defendant would have caused the 
trial court to reach a different conclusion as to the recommendation 
from Adult Probation and Parole. Reversal and remand for 
resentencing is appropriate in the instant case even if the trial 
court were to contend that it was unaffected by the assertions set 
forth in the undisclosed letters. Finally, public policy concerns 
mandate full disclosure of letters such as those in the instant case 
inasmuch as (1) the sentencing philosophy in the area of criminal law 
provide that the punishment should not only fit the crime but the 
defendant as well, (2) it is essential that fairness in the 
sentencing of defendants in the criminal system both be perceived as 
such by the public and the defendant and, in fact, be fair, and 
12 
(3) the information about the defendant must be accurate if society 
and the individual are to be properly served. 
2. In the course of imposing the determinate firearm 
enhancement for a full five years, the trial court exceeded the 
limits prescribed by law and thereby abused its discretion. By so 
doing, the trial court fixed a definite term of imprisonment, 
exceeding its authority set forth in the enhancement and sentencing 
statutes. 
3. Defendant's appointed trial counsel, by failing to object 
to the imposition by the trial court of a determinate term of five 
years pursuant to the firearm enhancement statute, denied Defendant 
of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 
ARGUMENTS 
1. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS 
RIGHTS TO NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD AND 
THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY NOT 
DISCLOSING THE NATURE AND CONTENTS OF THE CONFIDENTIAL 
LETTERS RECEIVED FROM VARIOUS INDIVIDUALS PRIOR TO 
SENTENCING, 
The right to due process, as guaranteed by both the United 
States1 and Utah Constitutions,2 requires that criminal proceedings 
xThe Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, 
in relevant part, that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law ." In addition, 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution states, in relevant part, that no state shall "deprive 
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be conducted to insure that the decision-making process is predicated 
upon accurate and reasonably reliable and relevant information. 
State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993); State v. Howell, 
707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985); State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 
(Utah 1982); State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Utah 1980). 
Inasmuch as sentencing is a critical part of a criminal proceeding, 
see State v. Bell, 754 P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 1988); Casarez, 656 P.2d at 
1007, "a defendant is entitled to due process protections during 
sentencing to prevent procedural unfairness." See Bell, 754 P.2d at 
58; Casarez, 656 P. 2d at 1007; see also Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 
14, 16, 99 S.Ct. 235, 236 (1978) (holding that procedural fairness is 
as obligatory at the sentencing phase of a trial as at the guilt 
phase). 
In Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197 (1977), the 
United States Supreme Court stated that uit is now clear that the 
sentencing process, as well as the trial itself, must satisfy the 
requirements of the Due Process clause . . . ." Id. at 358, 97 S.Ct. 
at 1204 (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254 (1967) and 
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 87 S.Ct. 1209 (1967)). Such 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law 
// 
2Article I, Section 7, of the Utah Constitution states, "No 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due 
process of law. 
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requirements include the opportunity to be heard and confronted by 
the witnesses against a defendant, and that a defendant be afforded 
an opportunity to present evidence in his or her own behalf. See 
Lipsky, 608 P.2d at 1247. 
Although a defendant "has no substantive right to a particular 
sentence within the range authorized by statute, the sentencing is a 
critical stage of the criminal proceeding at which he is entitled to 
the effective assistance of counsel. "3 Id. at 358, 97 S.Ct. at 1204-
05; Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252 (1948). "The 
defendant has a legitimate interest in the character of the procedure 
which leads to the imposition of sentence even if he may have no 
right to object to a particular result of the sentencing process. 
Id. (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521-23, 88 S.Ct. 
1770, 1776-78 (1968)). "If a sentencing judge is allowed to rely 
upon information unknown to the defendant, the ability of counsel to 
effectively challenge inaccurate information may be seriously 
impaired, thereby threatening the defendant's right to effective 
3The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
. . . have the Assistance of counsel for his defence." Article I, § 
12 of the Utah Constitution provides: "In criminal prosecutions the 
accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1) (a) provides: "In 
criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: To appear in person 
and defend in person or by counsel." 
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assistance of counsel." State v. Gomez, 887 P. 2d 853, 855 (Utah 
1994) (citing Casarez, 656 P.2d at 1007). 
The fundamental principles of procedural fairness in sentencing 
mandate the right of a defendant to examine and challenge the 
accuracy and reliability of the factual information upon which the 
sentence is based. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 855 (Utah 1994); Lipsky, 608 
P.2d at 148; State v. Hanson, 627 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 1981); State v. 
Anderson, 632 P. 2d 877, 878 (Utah 1981) . As a result, factual 
information upon which a sentence is based must be disclosed to a 
defendant, except in the rare case where the disclosure of the 
information would jeopardize the life or safety of third parties. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(5) (Supp. 1994); Casarez, 656 P.2d at 1008; 
accord Gomez, 887 P.2d at 855. In this regard, Utah Code Ann. § 77-
18-1(7) provides that " [a]t the time of sentence, the court shall 
receive any testimony, evidence, or information the defendant or the 
prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate 
sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall be 
presented in open court on record and in the presence of the 
defendant." (Emphasis Added). 
The issue of the trial court's failure to disclose the letters 
is raised for the first time on appeal. Ordinarily, the failure to 
raise an issue before the trial court precludes consideration of the 
16 
issue on appeal. State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 570 (Utah App. 
1994) . There are, however, two limited but well-established 
exceptions to this general rule. State v. Archambeau, 820 P. 2d 920, 
922 (Utah App. 1991). The appellate court may address an issue for 
the first time on appeal if the trial court committed plain error or 
there are exceptional circumstances. Id. 
In State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 
814, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989), the Utah Supreme Court outlined the 
following principles involved in determining whether "plain error" 
exists: 
The first requirement for a finding of plain 
error is that the error be "plain," i.e., from 
our examination of the record, we must be able 
to say that it should have been obvious to a 
trial court that it was committing error . . . . 
The second and somewhat interrelated requirement 
for a finding of plain error is that the error 
affect the substantial rights of the accused, 
i.e., that the error be harmful. 
Id. at 35; see also State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 
1993) . According to State v. Verde, 770 P. 2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 
1989), uin most circumstances, the term 'manifest injustice' [found 
in Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c)] is synonymous with the 'plain error' 
standard expressly provided in Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d) and 
elaborated upon in Eldredge . . . ." 
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The second exception is the catch-all device requiring 
"exceptional" or unusual" circumstances. Archambeau, 820 P. 2d at 
923. This exception acts as a safety device "to make certain that 
manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider an 
issue on appeal." Id. 
As to the plain error exception in the instant case, the trial 
court committed plain error by failing to disclose the contents or 
substance of the letters received by various individuals prior to 
sentencing, which contained various unsubstantiated allegations about 
Defendant. Because such a failure is a violation of due process and 
the effective assistance of counsel, it should have been obvious to 
the trial court that it was committing error. See Gomez, 887 P. 2d at 
855; Casarez, 656 P.2d at 1007; Lipsky, 608 P.2d at 1246-48. 
Secondly, the failure of the trial court to comply with the standards 
of due process and effective assistance of counsel affected the 
substantial rights of Defendant by failing to insure that Defendant 
was provided with requirements of due process and received effective 
assistance of counsel prior to sentencing. 
In addition to the "plain error" exception, the instant case 
presents exceptional or unusual circumstances. Defendant, for all 
intents and purposes, was not provided with due process and the 
effective assistance of counsel prior to the trial court imposing 
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sentence. Furthermore, Defendant's appointed trial counsel, by the 
trial court's failure, was unable to request disclosure of the 
contents or substance of the undisclosed letters. Defendant, was 
extremely unfamiliar with the constitutional and procedural due 
process requirements with which the trial court was required to 
comply prior to imposing sentence. Requirements that are of 
momentous constitutional concern. To not consider and correct this 
matter on appeal would result in a great and manifest injustice or 
harm by failing to protect the constitutional rights affected, as a 
result of the trial court's failures. 
In the instant case, Defendant, with appointed counsel, appeared 
for sentencing on August 8, 1995. At the beginning of the sentencing 
hearing, the trial court stated: 
I received a Presentence Report. I've also 
received a number of other letters both from 
parties that we've -- they were letters we 
previously received at the prior hearings. 
Also, I've received a letter from Valene Roundy, 
and also I think a letter from your mother that 
I have received. Now, Mr. Cella, have you had a 
chance to review the presentence report? 
(R. 178, lines 5-10, Sentencing Hearing Transcript) (emphasis added). 
As part of the record on appeal, included with the Presentence 
Investigation Report and sealed, are additional letters4 apparently 
4Because the letters are included in the record on appeal with 
the Presentence Investigation Report and, along with the Presentence 
Investigation Report, are sealed, the letters are referred to in an 
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received by the trial court before Defendant's sentencing, which the 
trial court failed to disclose to Defendant or Defendant's trial 
counsel. One of the letters, dated July 14, 1995, expresses 
appreciation to the trial court for reviewing various items submitted 
prior to the Pretrial Hearing on Defendant's negotiated plea. Among 
other things, the letter, without substantiation, alleges that 
(1) Defendant had been violating the law since the subject shooting, 
(2) the subject shooting was not an isolated incident, but the 
escalation of a violent pattern of events, and (3) Defendant had 
threatened other individual(s) with various dangerous weapons and 
devices. Apparently enclosed with the previously mentioned letter is 
another letter from an individual, which contains additional 
unsubstantiated allegations about Defendant, including allegations 
about drug use, drug dealing, violent threats to others, etc. 
Finally, apparently enclosed with the aforementioned letter, dated 
July 14, 1995, is a letter from an individual, claiming, among other 
things, that Defendant is a skillful manipulator that engaged in 
various abusive acts towards other individuals. All, or at least 
most, of the allegations contained in the aforementioned letters are 
anonymous fashion because they arguably fall within the scope of 
controlled judicial records. See Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, Rules 4-202.02(6), 4-202.03(6), and 4-203. 
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based on double hearsay accounts and statements, ambiguous 
descriptions, and otherwise unsubstantiated assertions. 
As evidenced by the record or the lack thereof, the trial court 
did not state on the record the contents or substance of the 
aforementioned letters that he might have considered material or 
otherwise. Moreover, the trial court made no reference, whatsoever, 
to receiving the previously mentioned letters. Rather, the trial 
court simply mentioned, in passing, the letters received from 
Defendant's mother and Valene Roundy, which are included with the 
undisclosed letters as part of the record on appeal (See R. 178, 
lines 5-9, Sentencing Hearing Transcript). Trial counsel made no 
request to examine or be apprised of the contents of the letters, due 
apparently to the trial court's failure to disclose the receipt of 
such letters. Further, the trial court did not indicate in the 
course of sentencing that there was any reason other than what should 
arguably be the customary practice for not disclosing the entire 
contents of the letters received by the trial court. See Gomez,887 
P.2d at 855; Casarezt 656 P.2d at 1008. 
By failing to disclose the contents of the letters received 
prior to imposing sentence, the trial court violated Defendant's 
fundamental rights to due process by precluding Defendant of notice 
and the opportunity to rebut and present evidence in his own behalf 
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as to the allegations made in the letters. Gomez, 887 P.2d at 855; 
Lipsky, 608 P. 2d at 1247, 1248; Hanson, 627 P. 2d at 55; Anderson, 632 
P.2d at 878; see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7). In so doing, the 
trial court failed to insure that the decision-making process and the 
ultimate sentence was predicated upon accurate and reasonably 
reliable and relevant information. See Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071; 
Howell, 707 P.2d at 118. In the instant case, the trial court made 
no effort to determine the reliability of the statements and 
allegations set forth the undisclosed letters. While "due process 
does not impose the full range of trial procedures designed to sift 
truth from error in sentencing proceedings . . . this does not mean 
. . . that there is no requirement that the evidence presented in 
sentencing procedures be reliable." Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071 
(citing United States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 663 (3rd Cir. 1993)); 
see also United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 634 (9th Cir. 1971) 
(stating that " [a] rational penal system must have some concern for 
the probable accuracy of the informational inputs in the sentencing 
process) (citing Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-41, 68 S. Ct. 
1252, 1255 (1948)); United States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030, 1040 (3rd 
Cir. 1981) (holding that "as a matter of due process, factual matters 
may be considered as a basis for sentence only if they have some 
minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation"). 
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In Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197 (1977), the 
United States Supreme Court held that it is a denial of due process 
to sentence a defendant on the basis of confidential information not 
disclosed to a defendant or his counsel. The Supreme Court, in the 
process, noted that under such circumstances u[t]he risk that some of 
the information accepted in confidence may be erroneous, or may be 
misinterpreted . . . by the sentencing judge, is manifest." Id. at 
359, 97 S.Ct. at 1205. In addition, the Supreme Court recognized the 
possibility that full disclosure by the trial court, followed by 
explanation or argument by defense counsel, would have caused the 
trial court to come to a different conclusion than that obtained 
without such explanation or argument. Id. at 362; 97 S.Ct. at 1207. 
Like Gardner, the instant case involves information that was 
held in confidence and never disclosed by the trial court prior to 
imposing sentence. Furthermore, in the instant case, like Gardner, 
had the trial court disclosed the content or substance of the letters 
to Defendant's counsel or Defendant, there is a possibility that 
possibility that explanation or argument by Defendant's counsel or 
Defendant would have caused the trial court to reach a different 
conclusion as to the recommendation from Adult Probation and Parole. 
In State v. Lockwood, 399 So.2d 190 (La. 1981), a case cited 
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with approval by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Casarez,5 the 
Louisiana Supreme Court held that even though the trial court 
contended that its sentencing decision was unaffected by the 
Presentence Investigation Report, a defendant, who alleges false and 
prejudicial statements were contained in his Report, was entitled to 
the opportunity to refute or explain the same. Id. at 193-94. The 
failure of the trial court to allow such an opportunity was assigned 
as error and reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with the court's opinion on that particular point. Id. at 194. 
Similarly, in the instant case, the trial court, in effect, 
refused to allow Defendant or Defendant's counsel the opportunity to 
refute or explain the unsubstantiated assertions about Defendant in 
the letters received by the trial court prior to sentencing. As in 
Lockwood, a reversal and remand for resentencing is appropriate in 
the instant case even if the trial court were to contend that it was 
unaffected by the assertions set forth in the undisclosed letters. 
Because of the trial court's complete failure to even disclose that 
the letters were received, this Court is left to wonder as to the 
trial court's rationale for such nondisclosure. While this Court 
might speculate that the trial court refused to disclose the content 
or substance of the letters because it believed that disclosure might 
sSee State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007-09 (Utah 1982). 
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lead to harm of a third person, such a conclusion is totally without 
support in the record. See Gomez, 887 P.2d at 855 (citing Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-1(5) (Supp. 1994) and Casarez, 656 P.2d at 1008). Even 
if this were the case, the trial court arguably is required to make 
such a finding and at least disclose the fact that the letters were 
to be considered confidential. See Casarez, 656 P. 2d at 1008 
(stating that "it is the exceptional case where full disclosure is 
not justified) . Instead, the trial court here appears to have 
subjectively determined that it would not disclose such information 
to Defendant or Defendant's counsel. 
In State v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that the defendant's rights to due process and effective 
assistance of counsel were not violated by the ex parte communication 
between the trial court and a probation officer that prepared the 
Presentence Investigation Report. As a basis for its holding, the 
Utah Supreme Court noted that the trial court provided the defendant 
with a ufull opportunity . . . to examine and challenge all factual 
information upon which the court based his sentence." Id. at 855. 
The court further recognized that after objection to the ex parte 
communication, the trial court "fully disclosed the purpose and 
substance of the communication and explained that no information 
beyond what was in the report was provided during that 
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communication." Id. The defendant subsequently had the opportunity 
to further inquire as to the information and to refute any inaccurate 
or unreliable information that might have been provided to the trial 
court, which the defendant failed to do. Id. The Utah Supreme 
Court, however, under an effective assistance of counsel analysis, 
stated, uIf a sentencing judge is allowed to rely upon information 
unknown to the defendant, the ability of counsel to effectively 
challenge inaccurate information may be seriously impaired, thereby 
threatening the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Id. (citing Casarez, 656 P.2d at 1007). 
Unlike Gomez, the trial court in the instant case did not 
provide Defendant with any opportunity to examine or challenge the 
information set forth in the undisclosed letters. Moreover, the 
trial court in the case at bar did not disclose that the letters 
were even received. By so doing, the trial court denied Defendant of 
his right to effective assistance of counsel to assure compliance 
with due process requirements. Id.; see also Casarez, 656 P.2d at 
1007 (holding that uif a defendant cannot inspect the contents o the 
presentence report, his constitutional right to the effective 
assistance of counsel at the time of sentencing is seriously impaired 
if a judge may rely on information which may be inaccurate and is 
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unknown to the defendant" (emphasis added)). One might point to the 
fact that Gomez and Casarez involved presentence investigation 
reports as some sort of a distinction between those cases and the 
instant case. However, the due process and effective assistance of 
counsel principles set forth above apply equally if not more so to a 
case such as this where the risk of unreliable information is greater 
due to fact that such letters often come from individuals with whom 
the trial court is unfamiliar and who often have some actual or 
apparent bias with which the court may or may not be familiar. 
Finally, public policy concerns mandate full disclosure of 
letters such as those in the instant case inasmuch as w[t]he 
sentencing philosophy of the criminal law is that the punishment 
should not only fit the crime but the defendant as well." Lipsky, 
608 P. 2d at 1248. Further, u[i]t is essential that fairness in 
sentencing both be perceived as such by the public and the defendant 
and, in fact, be fair." Id. at 1249. "The information about the 
defendant must be accurate if society and the individual are to be 
properly served." Id. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO A DETERMINATE SENTENCE OF FIVE 
27 
YEARS PURSUANT TO THE FIREARMS ENHANCEMENT SET 
FORTH IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203. 
An appellate court will set aside a sentence imposed by a trial 
court if the sentence represents an abuse of discretion, the trial 
court failed to consider all relevant factors, or the sentence 
imposed exceeded the limits prescribed by law. State v. Brown, 853 
P.2d 851, 861 (Utah 1992) (citing State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 
1135 (Utah 1989). However, when the trial court's interpretation and 
application of a statute to a defendant's sentence is reviewed by the 
appellate court for correction of error. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 
1355, 1357 (Utah 1993); State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 
1992) . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3), which applies to the instant case 
because of Defendant's conviction of a third degree felony by way of 
guilty plea, provides: 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may 
be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term as follows: 
(3) In the case of a felony of the 
third degree, for a term not to exceed 
five years but if the trier of fact 
finds a dangerous weapon or a 
facsimile or the representation of a 
dangerous weapon, as provided in 
Section 76-1-601, was used in the 
commission or furtherance of the 
felony, the court may additionally 
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sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five 
years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently. 
(Emphasis Added) . Subsection (1) of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-4 
provides, "Whenever a person is convicted of a crime and the judgment 
provides for a commitment to the state prison, the court shall not 
fix a definite term of imprisonment unless otherwise provided by 
law." Further, subsection (2) of § 77-18-4 states that "[t]he 
sentence and judgment of imprisonment shall be for an indeterminate 
term of not less than the minimum and not to exceed the maximum term 
provided by law for the particular crime." 
While the issue of whether the trial court erred or abused its 
discretion in the course of imposing the five year enhancement 
pursuant to the firearms enhancement statute is raised for the first 
time on appeal,6 the principles of plain error, as set forth in the 
aforementioned argument applies. Here, the error of imposing on 
Defendant a determinative sentence of five years under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-203 should have been obvious to the trial court in light of 
the plain language of the statute. Furthermore, the error was 
harmful in that the determinate sentence of five years communicates 
6See State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144-45 (Utah 1989) 
("contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation of 
claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record before 
an appellate court will review such a claim on appeal"). 
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to the Board of Pardons and Parole that not less than the five years 
should be served for the enhancement, which arguably prevents the 
Board from exercising its discretion in terms of fashioning the 
enhancement so as to give Defendant credit for any mitigating factors 
or improvements due him while in the correctional system. This 
places on Defendant the undue burden of constantly overcoming the 
determinate five year enhancement, which according to the plain 
language of the enhance statute should be indeterminate. 
In the course of sentencing in the case at bar, the following 
exchange between the trial court and defense counsel took place: 
THE COURT: . . . and because of those facts, 
and because of the circumstances where 
somebody's lost their life, court [sic] is going 
to enter the following sentence: To the charge 
of aggravated assault, a felony of the third 
degree, the Defendant is sentenced to the Utah 
State Prison for an indeterminate term of zero 
to five years. Court is going to order the 
firearm enhancement of five years to run 
consecutively. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Full five years? 
THE COURT: The full five years. . . . 
(R. 193, lines 14-23, Transcript of Sentencing Hearing; see also R. 
160, Sentence; and R. 169, Judgment). 
In the course of imposing the determinate firearm enhancement 
for a full five years, the trial court improperly interpreted the 
firearm enhancement statute. In the alternative, the trial court by 
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imposing the determinate term exceeded the limits prescribed by law 
and thereby abused its discretion. By so doing, the trial court 
erred by fixing a definite term of imprisonment, thereby exceeding 
its authority set forth in the enhancement and sentencing statutes. 
3. TRIAL COUNSEL, BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE IMPOSITION 
OF A DETERMINATE FIVE YEAR TERM OF FIVE YEARS UNDER 
THE FIREARM ENHANCEMENT STATUTE, DENIED DEFENDANT OF 
HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL. 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984), 
the United States Supreme Court established a two-prong test for 
determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel has been denied. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 
1064. Utah courts adopted this test, which follows: uTo prevail, a 
defendant must show, first, that his counsel rendered a deficient 
performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below 
an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment and, 
second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." Bundy 
v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988); accord State v. Templin, 
805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 
(Utah 1986); State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah App. 1995) 
State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah App. 1995). u[T]he right 
to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own 
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sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused 
to receive a fair trial." Lockhart v. Fretwell, U.S. , , 
113 S.Ct. 838, 842, (1993). 
In order to meet the first prong of the test, a defendant must 
uxidentify the acts or omissions' which, under the circumstances, 
xshow that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness.'" Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 (quoting Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 2064 (footnotes omitted)). 
A defendant must "overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel 
rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional 
judgment." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), cert. 
denied, 497 U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990). 
To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a 
defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support "a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceedings would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin, 805 P.2d at 187. UA reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; 
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 522 (Utah 1994); Frame, 723 P.2d at 
405. In the process of arriving at this determination, the appellate 
court "should consider the totality of the evidence, taking into 
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account such factors as whether the errors affect the entire 
evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and how strongly the 
verdict is supported by the record." Templin, 805 P.2d at 187. 
In the instant case, trial counsel's failure to object to the 
trial court imposing a determinative five year enhancement term under 
the firearms enhancement statute set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
203 fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment in light of the plain language of the firearms enhancement 
statute requiring an indeterminate term "not to exceed five years." 
But for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the sentencing 
proceedings would have been different inasmuch as it is reasonably 
probable that the trial court, upon objection from trial counsel, 
would have corrected the enhancement to that of a indeterminate term. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that this 
Court vacate his sentence and remand the case for resentencing in 
light of the contents set forth in the undisclosed letters submitted 
to the trial court after entry of Defendant's guilty plea but prior 
to sentencing so that Defendant might be receive, among other things, 
his constitutional right to due process and for the trial court to 
resentence Defendant on a nunc pro tunc basis. 
33 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION 
Defendant requests oral argument because oral argument will 
materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant 
issues in the instant appeal dealing with the constitutional right to 
due process, which are matters of continuing public interest and 
which involve issues requiring further development in the area of 
criminal law case development. Counsel for Defendant further 
requests that the method of disposition of the instant appeal be by 
opinion designated by the Court "For Official Publication" for 
purposes of precedential value in future cases. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J$f(\ day of July, 1996. 
lOLftaREN, ARNOLD & WIGGINS, L.C. 
SbetX^l, Wigc 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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